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TITLE VIII-GAMBLING AND ORGANIZED CRIME
I. INTRODUCTION
Today organized crime has deeply penetrated broad segments
of American life .... Its economic base is principally derived
from its virtual monopoly of illegal gambling, the numbers
racket, and importation of narcotics .... '
With these words, President Richard Nixon underscored the
dangers presented by organized crime's use of gambling. The
proceeds of such syndicated gambling activities are universally
acknowledged to be the financial lifeblood of organized crime.
2
With the capital initially obtained from illicit gambling, organized
crime operatives are able to bribe government officals, make polit-
ical contributions, engage in loan sharking operations, infiltrate
and contaminate legitimate businesses, 3 and hire the vast number
of attorneys, accountants and other professionals necessary to the
success of the operation.
4
In an effort to launch a frontal attack on syndicated gambling
throughout the United States, Congress enacted title VIII of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.
5
II. ENFORCEMENT INADEQUACIES OF THE FORMER LAW
Title VIII is designed to eliminate two deficiencies of the
former law which had crippled effective law enforcement in the
area of organized crime. The first inadequacy resulted from the
division of criminal law enforcement responsibility between vari-
ous federal, state and local authorities. Such fragmentation made a
unified attack on organized crime difficult, and resulted in a lack
of sufficient funds to provide adequate manpower for local law
1 H.R. Doc. No. 105, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1969).
2 Id. The scope of such gambling activities is indeed impressive. The President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice estimated that organ-
ized crime reaps up to fifty billion dollars annually from illegal gambling activities. In
contrast, the total amount of money bet legally in the United States at racetracks is five
billion dollars. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 189 (1967) [herein-
after cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
'Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 27 at 105 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings] (statement of Senator John L. McClellan).
4 H.R. Doc. No. 105, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1969).
5 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 [hereinafter cited as O.C.C.A.] 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1511, 1955 (Supp. 1971).
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enforcement agencies to cope successfully with illegal gambling
activities. 6 Under prior federal legislation dealing with illegal gam-
bling, interstate travel or use of an interstate facility had to be
proved as part of each case.7 Although many federal cases dem-
onstrate the dependency of gambling operations on the facilities of
interstate commerce, it had become increasingly obvious that
existing federal statutes were not broad enough to reach all major
gambling activities which were of legitimate concern to the Gov-
ernment. It has been repeatedly shown that the professionals who
run illegal gambling operations were well aware that federal in-
vestigative jurisdiction required the establishment of a specific
interstate link to their operations. Therefore, they were usually
careful to avoid creating such a link.8 Title VIII is designed to
permit federal law enforcement authorities to deal with illegal
gambling activities previously insulated from federal attack.
The second deficiency of former law regarding illegal gambling
stems from recent Supreme Court invalidation of certain Internal
Revenue Code provisions which facilitated federal, state and local
law enforcement in the illicit gambling area. Prior to 1969, the
wagering tax and registration sections of the Internal Revenue
Code were utilized effectively to combat syndicated crime. 9 These
provisions created an occupational tax on wagers, 10 and required
those liable for this tax to register with the Internal Revenue
Service and to supply detailed information of their operation in
addition to this registration. 1 Since many forms of gambling are
illegal in all states except Nevada, the natural result and probable
objective of this law was either (1) to force gamblers or operators
to register with the Service and in so doing admit their guilt (after
which they could be prosecuted under appropriate statutes), 12 or
(2) to enable the Government to prosecute for tax evasion and
non-registration those operatives who did not cooperate. Chal-
lenged on fifth amendment self-incrimination grounds, the Su-
preme Court initially upheld these sections in United States v.
Kahriger,'3 on the ground that the required registration was pros-
6 116 CONG. REC. S349 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1970).
7 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1952, 1953 (1964). E.g., under § 1084, which prohibits the trans-
mission of gambling information in interstate commerce, the great difficulty has been proof
of the conversation and the availability of wiretaps. See Katz v. United States. 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
8 In one instance a court-authorized interception of a telephone located in a gambling
headquarters disclosed that bets from persons outside the state were routinely being
declined. House Hearings 169.
9 26 U.S.C. §§ 4411, 4412 (1964).
10 Id. § 4411.
11 Id. § 4412.
12 Such prosecution would be under appropriate state and local gambling laws.
13 345 U.S. 22, 32 (1953).
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pective in effect, and consequently within the mandate of the fifth
amendment which protects only past and present acts.
The Kahriger decision was overruled in the Marchetti and
Grosso cases. 14 Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Harlan ex-
plained that the obligations to register imposed by the Internal
Revenue Code presented a "real and appreciable" hazard of
self-incrimination.
The central standard for the privilege's [fifth amendment]
application has been whether the claimant is confronted by
substantial and real not merely trifling or imaginary hazards
of incrimination .... This principle does not permit the rigid
chronological distinction adopted in Kahriger.
15
The inevitable result of these decisions was to destroy the
effectiveness of the tax and registration requirements. Title VIII
is constructed to fill the void left by the Court's decision. 16
Congress' attempt to remedy these inadequacies by enactment
of title VIII is based on its authority to regulate interstate com-
merce.1 7 In pointing out the justification and need for extensive
federal jurisdiction to deal effectively with syndicated gambling,
Congress cites the detrimental effects of organized crime activities
on the nation's economic system, the domestic security, and the
general welfare of the nation and its citizens.'
As early as 1903, the Supreme Court upheld federal legislation
regulating gambling on the grounds that lottery tickets were a
"subject of commerce" which could be restricted by Congress
pursuant to its authority under the commerce clause.' 9 Despite
the fact that the regulated acts take place entirely within state
lines, Congress may control that activity so long as it has even a
remote impact on interstate commerce.2 0
14 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); United States v. Grosso, 390 U.S. 62
(1968).
15 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968).
16 Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1962, S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 2122,
and S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings] (statement by John N. Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General).
17 Title VIII begins with the statement that Congress "finds that illegal gambling
involves widespread use of, and has an effect upon, interstate commerce and the facilities
thereof." O.C.C.A. § 801.
18 O.C.C.A., Statement of Findings and Purpose.
19 Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
2 0 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), in which petitioner had consumed
on his premises all wheat grown in excess of Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 quotas.
The Court upheld his penalty on grounds that Congress could regulate any activity that
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, regardless of how local the activity might
be. See also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upheld the
constitutionality of certain public accommodations sections of the Civil Rights Act of
1964). It held that the commerce power of Congress also includes the power to regulate
the local activities, which might have a harmful effect upon that (interstate) commerce. 379
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II1. TITLE VlIl'S SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
The criminal prohibitions of title VIII are contained in two
sections. The first makes it a federal crime to conspire to interfere
with state or local law enforcement "with the intent to facilitate
an illegal gambling business." 21 Before any liability may be im-
posed under this section of the Act, three requirements must be
fulfilled: (1) there must be an overt act of conspiracy; (2) one of
the conspirators must be an elected or appointed governmental
official or employee; and (3) one or more of the participants must
conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own all or part of
an illegal gambling business. 22 Legal gambling operations such as
bingo, lottery, or similar games of chance conducted by a tax
exempt organization as defined in the Internal Revenue Code are
specifically exempted from the provisions of the Act.
The other substantive section of title VIII directly prohibits the
operation of gambling businesses which (a) are prohibited by state
or local law, (b) involve five or more persons, and (c) have been in
operation for thirty days, or gross more than two thousand dollars
in any single day.
23
Questions. may arise concerning the propriety and con-
stitutionality of the Act's definition of "illegal gambling business-
es." The first element of the definition in the federal Act is an
adoption of the state law definition of illegal gambling. This provi-
sion is, of course, designed to leave those types of gambling
permitted by the laws of various states unaffected by the Act in
those respective states. Apart from this single all or nothing
distinction, however, the Act fails to take into account a state's
determination of the severity of a particular proscribed gambling
offense. The gambling laws of several states vary tremendously,
U.S. at 258; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) in which the operation of a
restaurant whose sole contact with interstate commerce was the receipt of seventy thou-
sand dollars worth of food was held to be a sufficient exercise of interstate commerce to
justify application of the Civil Rights Act. The Court founded its decision on its conclusion
that Congress had a rational basis for finding that discrimination in restaurants had a direct
and adverse effect on interstate commerce.
21 18 U.S.C.A. § 1511 (a) (Supp. 1971). Examples of such interference include bribery
and corruption of police and other local officials. See SENATE REPORT 7 1.
2 18 U.S.C.A. § 1511(a) (Supp. 1971).
2 18 U.S.C.A. § 1955(6)(1)(i) (Supp. 1971) defines illegal gambling business in terms of
violation of "the law of a State or political sub-division in which it is conducted." Thus
§ 1955 would apply only in instances where the gambling violated state or local laws and in
those instances federal penalties may be levied.
The criminal sanctions for violating either of the above proscriptive sections of the Act
are in part identical. Both authorize fines up to twenty thousand dollars or imprisonment
for up to five years, or both. In addition, the section prohibiting illegal gambling businesses
includes a criminal forfeiture provision which applies to "any property, including money
used in violation of this section [1955]." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1955(d) (Supp. 1971).
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providing for fines as low as fifty to one hundred dollars for
violation of the state's criminal gambling laws. 24 The magnitude of
these fines essentially reflects the moral judgment of the state
legislature concerning the turpitude of the crime committed. In
this respect, the difference between the state with no gambling
restrictions and the state with offenses calling for varying sanc-
tions is one of degree. Yet, the provisions of title VIII make no
distinction in regard to the seriousness of a gambling offense
except for the initial illegality under state law.
2 5
Nevertheless, it is well established that Congress may define
the content of proscribed conduct by adoption of state law. In
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R.R.,26 the Supreme
Court upheld a federal law prohibiting the interstate shipment into
any state of liquor intended to be sold in violation of the law of
that state. The defendant argued that the federal law entailed an
unconstitutional delegation of congressional authority to the
states, since liquor regulation was left to the control of each state.
Because state law varied widely throughout the United States,
this delegation resulted in a non-uniform treatment of liquor sales.
In rejecting the defendant's contention, the Court held that there
was no constitutional requirement that federal regulation of in-
terstate commerce be uniform throughout the nation. The decision
to permit state law to govern was clearly within the discretion of
Congress.
There is strong precedent for the rule that Congress may adopt
state criminal legislation, so that an act made criminal by state law
is a federal offense punishable as provided by state law.2 7 In 1969,
the Suprme Court upheld legislation prohibiting travel in in-
terstate commerce with intent to commit "extortion" as defined
by state law.2 8 The Court stated that the congressional decision to
leave the definition of "extortion" to state law reflected the legis-
lature's judgment that "certain activities of organized crime which
were violative of state law had become a national problem."'2 9 The
congressional determination in title VIII to leave the definition of
"illegal gambling" to state law is clearly analogous and would
24 House Hearings 192.
25 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1955(a), (b)(1) (Supp. 1971).2 6 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
27 See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958), where the Court, upholding
federal legislation adopting state law as the definition of federal crime, ruled that a sexual
offense committed on an airbase which was made criminal by state law was an indictable
federal offense. Such federal legislation was not an undue delegation of congressional
authority, but a "practical accommodation of the mechanics of the legislative function of
State and Nation in the field of police power .. " Id. at 294.
28 United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286 (1969).
29 Id. at 292.
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therefore seem to fall within the legislature's authority to establish
means adequate to cope with the problem of organized crime.
The remaining two elements of the definition of an "illegal
gambling business"-that it involves five or more persons, and
has been in continuous operation for thirty days or has gross
revenue of two thousand dollars in any single day-are, on their
face, much less troublesome. These provisions reflect a congres-
sional intent not to preempt local law enforcement but merely to
expand available forces to fight organized crime.30 The congres-
sional feeling is that the definition of "illegal gambling business"
provides a standard that will insure that the federal effort is
directed only at the major gambling operations-those involving
five or more persons and grossing at least two thousand dollars in
a single day. It was pointed out that as a practical matter the
statute will not apply to sporadic or insignificant operations be-
cause it is usually possible to prove only a relatively small propor-
tion of the total gross of a gambling enterprise.
3 '
A more unique aspect of this section is the presumption it
creates with regard to probable cause. For purposes of obtaining
arrest or search warrants, if it can be proved that the gambling
business involves five or more management personnel or that the
"business operates for two or more successive days," then as a
matter of law there is probable cause to believe that "the business
receives gross revenue in excess of $2,000 in any single day."
32
Such a finding thus brings the operation within the purview of the
Act.
A constitutional problem may be involved in the provision for a
statutory presumption establishing probable cause for purposes of
issuing arrest and search warrants.33 In effect, this provision per-
mits warrants to issue for a search or arrest if there is probable
cause to believe that a gambling operation exists consisting of five
men without regard to the two thousand dollar minimum. Con-
sequently, this provision of the Act will apply to any gambling
operation, illegal under state law, regardless of the amount of
money involved so long as it consists of five men. The con-
stitutionality of the use of statutory presumptions in criminal
cases arose in Tot v. United States.3 4 In this case, the Supreme
Court invalidated a federal statutory presumption which provided
that the possession of a firearm or ammunition by a convict or
10 Senate Hearings at 38 1.
31 116 CONG. REC. S348 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1970).
32 18 U.S.C.A. § 1955(c) (Supp. 1971).
33 Id.
- 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
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fugitive from justice created a presumption that such firearm or
ammunition was shipped in violation of the statute. Since there
was no rational connection between the fact proved (possession)
and the ultimate fact presumed (illegal shipment), the presumption
violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment. However,
the Court indicated that Congress could create such presumptions
when the inference of the ultimate fact was founded in "common
experience" and had a "reasonable relation to the circumstances
of life as we know them ....
In the 1965 case of United States v. Gainey,3 6 the Court
upheld a statutory inference which authorized the jury to infer
guilt of illegal distillation of liquor from the accused's unexplained
presence at an illegal still. This inference was held rational, given
the circumstances surrounding the operation of an illegal dis-
tillery. Thus if the fact of five or more persons operating a gam-
bling business for two or more days bears a reasonable connection
with the presumption of probable cause that the business grosses
two thousand dollars a day, then the presumption would not be
unwarranted since it is founded on a reasonable relationship of the
two events.
However, it is unclear how the Government will establish this
reasonable connection. There is neither data nor discussion in
either the Senate or House proceedings which would tend to
support the probable cause inference made in this section. Be-
cause no testimony or evidence was presented in the matter, there
is no legislative history to provide an empirical basis to permit a
court to conclude that the presumption bears a reasonable relation
to common experience of gambling syndicates. The absence of
empirical support was not, however, fatal to the presumption in
the Gainey case. The Court upheld the inference, although un-
substantiated, as reasonable in light of the "practical impossibility
of proving ... actual participation in the illegal activities except
by inference drawn, from [the defendant's] presence when the
illegal acts were committed .... 37 Thus it is not essential that
empirical data exist to support title VIII's presumption, provided
that the court is convinced of the need for the presumption in the
context of the offense it is designed to curtail.
35 Id. at 467-68. An example of an irrational presumption was given in Manley v.
Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929). In this case, the Court invalidated a state statute providing
that a bank's insolvency was deemed fraudulent for purposes of imposing criminal liability
on the bank directors. The Court found that this presumption violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment because the connection between the fact of bank
insolvency and the presumed fraud was insufficient, arbitrary, and unreasonable.
36 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
37 Id. at 65.
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In the more recent case of Leary v. United States,3 8 the Su-
preme Court may have established a more difficult standard for
constitutionality of legislative presumptions. In this case, posses-
sion of marijuana was made prima facie evidence of illegal impor-
tation, and of defendant's knowledge of such illegal importation.
The Court stated that criminal statutory presumptions could be
upheld only when "the presumed fact is more likely than not to
flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend."
39
Examining the empirical data regarding importation of marijuana,
the Court concluded that although most of the drug was imported,
it was impossible to derive from this fact the conclusion that
marijuana users were aware of such importation. 40 Under the
Leary test, title VIII's presumption of a two thousand dollar daily
profit could be held constitutional only if the court were con-
vinced that such a conclusion was more likely than not to result
from a gambling operation by five or more persons for two or
more days.
IV. CONCLUSION
The inadequacies of present attempts to deal with the problem
of organized gambling has prompted title VIII. Under this title a
substantive federal gambling law is created by incorporating state
prohibitions against gambling and increasing the penalties in-
volved. The legislative presumption of title VIII facilitating the
issuance of search and arrest warrants will require a judicial
determination of constitutionality before its usefulness can be
ascertained.
38 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
39 Id. at 36.
40 Id. at 46. See also Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970), in which the Court
used the Leary test to uphold a similar legislative presumption regarding heroin and to void
the presumption regarding cocaine.
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